Studies of industry evolution are relatively scarce outside of industries defined by narrow technological bases. Studies of wholesaling are rarer still. These are curious features given that it is probable that service industries behave differently to manufacturing ones and that wholesaling is such a key function of many economies. This paper looks at the evolution of grocery wholesaling and grocery wholesalers in Ireland and Britain since 1930. It focuses on the processes and drivers of the wholesale industry. Similarities and differences between the two countries are discussed. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of government action as a triggering mechanism for change and on the role of trade associations and industry leaders in developing and following through on market and non-market strategies. The pathways of industry evolution identified differ from those seen in manufacturing. They therefore raise a number of issues for the development of understanding and conceptualisation in industry evolution studies.
Introduction
The study of industry evolution has attracted growing interest among economists and management academics over the past twenty years, driven by the level of change experienced by many industries. The aim of this increasing body of research has been to develop models that explain the changes being observed. From this it is hoped that useful and practical help can be provided to practicing managers who struggle to manage the changes taking place.
However, the research agenda, to date, has been limited at a number of levels. Firstly, there has been a much stronger focus on studying industry demographics and to some extent industry dynamics rather than full blown studies of structural evolution. Secondly, there has been a strong bias in the choice of industries studied. For the most part, manufacturing industries, particularly ones with a strong technology content have predominated. The nonmanufacturing sector has been neglected, despite the growth of service industries and the prevalence and importance of distribution industries like wholesaling and retailing in the modern global economy. The outcome has been that our understanding of the process of industry level structural evolution has been limited. This paper looks to expand our understanding of industry evolution by reporting on research that compares the evolution of grocery wholesaling in both Britain and Ireland. The paper asks: what are the main explanatory drivers of industry evolution and can a pattern of process be observed? By doing so it attempts to go some way towards redressing the research imbalance that currently marginalizes distribution industries.
The Process of Industry Evolution
Most of the empirical studies that have been conducted, to date, have focused on manufacturing industries, particularly those defined by a narrow technological base. The outcome of this has been that the industry lifecycle has been identified, and remains, the main process model with empirical support. Industry lifecycle thinking has its origins in efforts to extend the product lifecycle to an industry level of analysis (Klepper, 1997) . Abernathy and Utterback's (1975) seminal paper explained patterns of innovation by linking the technology lifecycle and the process of industry evolution. Underpinning this was the proposition that technology based innovation was the primary driver of the evolutionary process. Much of the subsequent evidence used to support the lifecycle concept was thus drawn from studies covering industries like automobiles, typewriters, automobile tires, commercial aircraft, televisions and penicillin (Klepper, 1997) .
However, the generic explanatory power of the lifecycle model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975) was quickly challenged by Pavitt and Rothwell (1976) on the basis that it was 'not wholly consistent with the different patterns of innovation observed ' (p. 377) . Porter (1980) questioned the possibility of a generic model of process and called for more attention on underlying drivers. Mowery and Nelson (1999) noted the dangers of relying too much on 'theories of industry life-cycles that focus on the evolution of limited product classes'; and highlighted the lifecycle model's inability to explain the evolution of industries more widely defined than on a single technological base. Klepper (1997) observed that while the lifecycle concept works well in describing the formative eras of many industries, it does not capture fully the dynamics of the mature phase, particularly the issue of de-maturity. Furthermore, he also postulated that some industries do not, in fact, conform to the lifecycle model. The life cycle stages of maturity and decline have proved particularly problematic. This can be seen when trying to explain the evolution of older industries, particularly those that provide basic necessities such as food and construction materials. Such industries can be seen to reach a "mature" stage but not decline (Grant, 2005) . Despite all of these inherent weaknesses, McGahan et al (2004: 2) 
have recently observed that 'the industry lifecycle model -is so widely accepted and its basic premises so taken for granted that it has become conventional wisdom in business'
There have been a number of attempts to expand the understanding of industry evolution outside of manufacturing. Barras (1986) proposed the existence of a reverse lifecycle for service industries. He suggested that service industries do not experience a technology driven take-off or introduction phase. Instead, new technologies start out as a means of increasing the delivery efficiency of existing services. Over time the new technology is applied to improving the quality of service before finally moving on to assist in generating wholly transformed or new services. As such, where manufacturing industries experience product innovation followed by process innovation, service industries experience a cycle of incremental process innovation followed by radical process innovation and finally product innovation.
This reverse lifecycle has found some support from Pandit and Cooke (2003) in their study of the British financial services industry and Aranda and Molina-Fernandes (2002) in their study of Spanish engineering consultancies. However, the reverse lifecycle has also been subjected to criticism. Langeard and Eiglier (1990) consider the model to be valid only for services with a substantial back-office. Petit (1990) sees the model's main area of strength to be in household services, which have a significant level of self-service while Gallouj (1998: 14) found it to be 'less a theory of innovation in services than a theory of the spread of technological innovation from manufacturers to services'. A more fundamental weakness, however, may be that Barras continues to focus on the role of technology rather than on a wider driver set.
In the distribution field Fein (1998) , in his evolutionary study of US drug wholesaling, demonstrated that wholesaling differs from manufacturing type industries, with pre-existing theories of change applying unevenly, if at all. These issues have been taken up by Quinn and Murray (2005) and Quinn and Leavy (2005) in their study of the evolution of wholesaling industries in Ireland, in which they reveal no evidence of life cycle and identify an expanded range of evolutionary drivers.
It is clear that while lifecycle thinking offers a powerful way of explaining the process of industry evolution, within certain contexts it appears to be incomplete. McGahan et. al (2004) , Ruef (2004) and Windrum (2005) have called for more fine grained studies of industries at maturity and regeneration as a way of extending understanding of later evolutionary stages. Others (e.g. Utterback 1994 , Klepper 1997 , Fein 1998 , Quinn and Murray 2005 , Quinn and Leavy 2005 point to the need to expand the range of studies to nonmanufacturing industries such as wholesaling and retailing. This paper responds to these calls.
Wholesaling as a Research Domain
Over twenty years ago, Dawson and Moir (1985) concluded their review of wholesaling in Great Britain by noting that "within government and academic groups, there is little recognition of the importance of wholesaling, despite its key position in the dynamic economy of distribution" (p20). They drew an important distinction between the acts and processes of wholesaling and the organisations that undertook these activities, some of which were wholesalers i.e. their primary function was wholesaling. They further note that "although the wholesaling sector is a major sector in the British economy, relatively little is known about the way it operates … but from observation it is clear that the sector is undergoing rapid change" (p20).
In the intervening period, studies of wholesalers and wholesaling have become even less common. Rosenbloom attempted to breathe life into research on wholesaling in the USA, culminating in a 1994 special edition of the Journal of Marketing Channels (Rosenbloom 1994 ). However, this effort has not been sustained. In the UK research on wholesaling became effectively non-existent. This lack of both interest and understanding may have occurred in part because wholesaling activities have increasingly been undertaken by manufacturers, retailers or other channel organisations such as logistics services providers Shaw 1989, Fernie and Sparks 2004) . Wholesaling as a dynamic supply activity has become a battleground for competing power and efficiency stratagems of manufacturers and retailers. In many product sectors it would appear that wholesaling is of critical importance in performance terms, but that wholesalers have become less visible, probably less significant and thus of less importance to study. This is not to say that wholesaler numbers have been in decline in every product sector, but rather that their economic significance has shifted. In order to survive and prosper wholesalers and the wholesale sector, like wholesaling as an activity, have changed. This makes the study of the industry evolution of wholesaling important and potentially significant. Dawson and Moir (1985) considered the British market. There is no doubt however that many of the changes and trends they identified occur also in other countries. There may be variation in the extent and timing of change by product sector and by country, but there is agreement that wholesale activities are increasingly blurred within supply and demand chains. Retailer-generated reconfiguration of supply systems in for example Japan, Korea, Poland, Spain or Ireland are affecting the stability and survival of traditional wholesalers, as well as affecting retail competition for consumers. There are thus comparative, international and global dimensions to research into wholesaling and wholesalers.
Wholesaling is a large and wide-ranging sector of most economies. Not all product sectors within wholesaling are undergoing the same set of changes at the same time, though there may be some consistent themes in the long run (Quinn and Murray 2005; Quinn and Leavy 2005) . Grocery wholesaling is probably the largest wholesaling sector, and arguably the one most affected by change. Furthermore, whilst grocery wholesaling is important in itself, due to its scale and supply of products to meet basic needs, it is also significant because of the activities of major manufacturers and major retailers. As such the study of the grocery wholesaling sector potentially illuminates behaviours, affects, responses and futures for other wholesaling sectors.
This paper attempts to present and account for industry evolution in grocery wholesaling in Ireland and Britain since the 1930s, focusing on drivers and processes. A long-run approach is taken in order to evaluate the inter-acting affects of activities, changes, legislation and power struggles. The paper is primarily concerned with grocery wholesalers, but as noted above, understanding changes in grocery wholesalers requires accounting for changes in wholesaling itself and those undertaking wholesaling activities. The paper also considers in part about the changing nature of retailing and retail firms and their activities during this period.
The paper is divided into four further sections. First, the approach and methodology are presented. Some of this has been noted elsewhere (Quinn 2002; Quinn and Murray 2005; Quinn and Leavy 2005; Quinn and Sparks 2006) . Secondly, a tabulated comparative synopsis of the case data is presented. Thirdly, a comparative discussion is provided. Finally, conclusions are drawn.
The Research Approach and Methodology
This research seeks to explore how context, social action and history interplay in driving and patterning the process of evolution in wholesaling over time. In doing so it employs a qualitative methodology based on multi-modal and multi-level approaches, focused on a long-time period. Few templates are available to guide inductive research into the dynamics of industry evolution using such approaches. This study adopted an approach akin in method and perspective to the contextualist research strategy developed for the Warwick studies on corporate change (Pettigrew 1987 (Pettigrew , 1990 (Pettigrew , 1997 . It is thus informed by a number of principles:
 Multiple levels of analysis were used to connect context, process and outcome;  An underlying theory of social action was employed;  A longitudinal case-based research design was employed to allow patterns of continuity and change to be observed over time. Case based research offers special challenges for journal authors and readers. The richness and quantity of data available sits uneasily within the confines of most journal guidelines on space. That said, the academic world is producing an increasing body of rich case research that can contribute much to our understanding of the business world. The dilemma is therefore finding a balance. Authors must find ways of presenting data in a way that captures the essence of their material and allows for sufficient 'feel' on the part of reader. This can often entail making painful decisions that balance detail and conciseness. This paper attempts to bridge this gap through a tabulated comparative synopsis that looks to provide sufficient data exposure for the reader together with a time line of events (Table 1) . have a 54% market share. The rest is divided between multiples (25%) and the Co-op (20%)  There was intense price competition throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s that led to significant margin erosion.
Starting Conditions  Approx 300 wholesalers with 25 larger ones  They service a retail sector where independent retailers have 75% of the retail market and multiples command the other 25%  There was intense price competition throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s that led to significant margin erosion.
-1945:
Creating stable structures  The intensity of price competition creates pressure to bring order to the sector.  Manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers came together under the banner of the Grocery Proprietary Articles Council (GPAC) to enforce a system of Resale Price Maintenance. In 1936 GPAC armed itself with rules and sanctions that would allow them to stop supplies to 'errant' traders i.e. price cutters. The restrictions of RPM were actively resisted by the large retail multiples and by the Co-operatives.  In 1937 the Shops (Retail Trading Safeguards) Bill looked to restrict the growth of multiples and protect independent retailers. It failed due opposition from multiple and Cooperative retailers and lack of support and political power from wholesalers and independent retailers. However, the growth of multiples and the Co-op slowed during the period.  WW2 brought shortages of goods and manpower, Government control of prices and margins, and restrictions
-1945: A consolidation of power  In a new government introduced a protectionist regime
that affected the importation of many grocery items. This brought a new insularity to the sector that undermined competitiveness and allowed some to extract excessive profits.  Following a period of intense price competition, manufacturers' trade associations looked to enhance profitability by pressing for lower distribution margins. In response, the largest wholesalers, formed the Association of Wholesale Grocers, Importers and Distributors (AWGID and 75 smaller wholesale firms set up the Wholesale Grocers Association of Ireland (WGAI).  Wholesaler associations won better terms from manufacturers, stabilised prices and disciplined members who broke association rules. The end result was a rigidly controlled distribution system with tight control on pricing structures.  The Second World War brought price controls and rationing on entry to the trade. GPAC focused on dealing with profiteering and assisting manufacturer members to maintain continuance of equitable distribution. The war favoured the independent sector and enhanced and consolidated the wholesaler's role.
 A growing sense of grievance among retailers over terms and conditions of supply and margins saw the formation of the Retail, Grocery, Dairy and Allied Trades' Association (RGDATA) in 1942. 1946 -1953: A build-up of tensions  Rationing was slowly dismantled before ending in 1954  The arrival of a new Labour government brought pressures for lower cost solutions in food distribution.  Self-service was introduced in 1947 and encouraged by government but was slow to grow due to a licensing requirement for the building materials required to enable it.  In 1947 a committee of inquiry was set up under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Sir George Lloyd Jacob to investigate RPM. The committee criticised the role of RPM, Trade Association behaviour and GPAC.  From the late 1940s tensions were building in the wholesaler -retailer relationship. Wholesalers were seen to be resisting reform, opposing retail buying groups and appropriating retailer margins. Trade associations were central to maintaining a balance of power both within and between the various channel actors within the grocery sector.  A survey of wholesaler costs revealed that wholesalers net profit before tax was under 2%.  Trade associations played a significant role throughout the 1950s in both promoting and retarding change. In 1953 Charles Green, the NFWG President, called for reform in wholesaling to reduce distribution costs and improve service to retailers. Herman Kent, the Secretary General of the Retailers Federation, called for closer co-operation between wholesaler and retailer to cut costs.
-1953:
A build-up of tensions  Rationing ended in the 1940s and pent-up demand was released.  New entrants emerged in both wholesaling and retailing, drawn by demand growth. These fell outside the existing structures and fermented a bout of price cutting.  Growing price competition confronted a wholesale sector that had become inefficient and vulnerable to competition.  RGDATA looked to ensure that wholesalers did not supply the newly emerging price-cutters.  Tensions grew as wholesalers sought to protect their margins in the face of cut-price retailing and mixed retail-cumwholesale trading. The wholesaler associations found it increasingly difficult to maintain price discipline amongst their members. WGAI, in particular found it difficult as its membership included firms who were both wholesaler and retailer.  Significant growth in branded goods and along with prepacked and processed foods led to an increase in the marketing activity of manufacturers, which they looked to fund through restructuring channel discounts, at the expense of wholesalers.  Government concerns about escalating food prices from the late 1940s led to the introduction of the Restrictive Trades Practices Act (1953) by SPAR wholesalers and Keencost by AND/MACE.  By the early 1970s, the retail multiples had secured 33% of the market. Meanwhile the number of independent retailers had fallen sharply and would continue to decline. By the early 1970s, the grocery wholesaling industry had been changed profoundly. The plethora of independent wholesalers had consolidated into four wholesaler groupings. Two of these, Musgraves and BWG, had clearly emerged as new industry leaders.  There was a further decline in the independent retail sector and a corresponding decline in the position of grocery wholesalers. This was the outcome of relentless growth among multiples, facilitated by favourable planning and competition regulations, and changing consumer demands.  In 1977 Tesco led a switch from trading stamps to low pricing that changed the locus of supermarket competition.  In the late 1970s large multiples were suspected of using their market power to force unjustified discounts from manufacturers. Wholesalers and smaller retailers believed that they were being unfairly disadvantaged by this action.  Independent retailers and wholesalers looked to influence government with a view to restricting the growth of the multiples. However, they lacked cohesion and proved ineffectual as their trade associations had become increasingly toothless. In contrast, the multiples acted in consort and succeeded in convincing consumers and (the Thatcher Conservative) government that they were the 'consumers champion'.  The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) Musgraves re-segmented the market by introducing the SuperValu symbol for trolley shopping and Centra for convenience. Meanwhile, BWG developed SPAR as a convenience brand.  In 1990s BWG introduced EUROSPAR for trolley shopping and also acquired the MACE franchise and developed it as a second convenience brand  Beginning in the 1980s cash and carry began to decline in favour of group trading. While it remained a significant format it increasingly focused on non-retail customers such as caterers, pubs and other grocery outlets.  The period from the early 1990s was generally good for symbol group trading and the wholesale sector. The protection afforded by the 1987 Groceries Order gave independent retailers more confidence in their survival. Many began to upgrade their stores and tie their fortunes to the leading symbol groups, which in turn had clear strategies for their formats.  In 1997, Tesco re-entered the Irish market through the acquisition of Power Supermarkets and were followed soon  The consolidation amongst wholesalers has had repercussions for group trading. In the early 1970s there were 21 symbols operated by over 100 wholesalers, with 14 having over 1000 members. In 2005 there were 13 symbols with five having over 1000 members. Only SPAR and MACE are of substance. SPAR now functions through five wholesalers while MACE is operated by one. New symbol groups such as Costcutter, Premier and Lifestyle/Scandia have appeared and developed strongly.  In the mid 1990s the liberalisation of planning was reversed and a new focus placed on town centre development. The multiples were forced to take a renewed look at smaller urban sites and this generated a rapid move into convenience stores and other local formats. This was accelerated by major takeovers, as in the case of Tesco. Such outlets now compete directly with voluntary group formats and other convenience stores .  The Federation of Wholesale Distributors (FWD) and the Association of Convenience Stores both opposed the Tesco convenience takeovers. Together they lobbied hard for the current Competition Authority investigation into grocery retailing.  The more recent findings of a Competition Commission (2000) inquiry into the industry, which looked for evidence of "monopolies that appear to operate against the public", suggested once again that little action would be taken against the leading retail businesses. Independent investigations into the industry have tended to conclude that while UK food retailers may use their power to "exploit" manufacturers and suppliers, the practice is good for the consumer because savings tend to be passed on through lower prices. As such, the government after by Aldi and Lidl.  Economic prosperity and changing life styles also played a part. Unprecedented year-on-year growth in disposable incomes, an increase in both single households and married couples in the workforce led to resurgence in demand for convenience shopping. It also fuelled a dramatic expansion in the catering sector as eating out became a significant activity for a cash rich and time poor population. These trends helped to fuel a recovery in the position of wholesaling and wholesalers. Irish grocery wholesalers came to control over 40% of the national grocery market.  By 2005 however the long-term pressure on the 1987
Groceries Order and concerns about high prices in Ireland brought about a review of its impact. In November 2005 the Groceries Order was abolished, although there remain restrictions on predatory pricing, enforceable via competition authorities. The outcomes of this step for the independent retail sector and its wholesaling symbol group managers are yet to be seen.
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has not been minded to institute any remedies, fearing being accused of raising prices for consumers. A further inquiry announced in Spring 2006 will test this situation again.  With the growth in the convenience sector the prospects for group trading looks reasonable. The recent acquisition of Londis by Musgraves and their decision to return their Budgen chain stores to independent ownership mean that further developments in group trading may lie on the horizon
Discussion of the Cases
In examining the totality of change in the two countries, a similar phase pattern can be seen to emerge. While the phase progressions were clearly not as sharply defined as the time line aspect of the tabulated comparative synopsis, in both industries broadly similar evolutionary patterns have been followed, and in relatively synchronised time frames. These phases are reflected in the case table, mapped in Figure 1 and can be considered in the sequence in which they are observed.
Structural Reinforcement
During the 1930s grocery wholesaling was in the midst of a phase of structural reinforcement. In both countries leading firms were trying to re-establish stable trading structures and build clear demarcation lines around existing structures. This was characterised by the efforts to preserve and strengthen the existing industry structure in the face of emerging pressures for change. While there are specific differences between the two countries the aim is similar and the reliance on trade associations of varying kinds is shared.
The war years served to enhance existing structures and make them more embedded. Actions were aimed at ensuring that the grip of the existing wholesale industry leaders continued to hold sway. The pressures for change remained below breakthrough level.
Structural Tension
During the early post-war years, there was a new phase of growing structural tension, characterised by the escalation of both change and reactionary pressures. Grocery wholesaler leaders intensified their efforts to protect and strengthen existing structures, individually and through trade association activity. Sector norms had become firmly established in areas such as the supply of goods, price structure, method and degree of competition and trading format.
At the same time, the pressure for change in and around the industry was rising. Relations between retailers and wholesalers became more fractious in Ireland as both wholesalers and retailers adopted a more distrustful approach to each other. Consumer and retail buyers, suppliers, firms outside the leading groups, and government were all becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the existing restrictive practices.
Structural Fracture
The old order finally began to fracture as the constituency for change continued to widen and the pressure intensified. Once the stranglehold of the old leaders was loosened by the intervention of government, opportunities for others to seize the initiative were opened up.
Firms that had long led grocery wholesaling began to be subjected to levels of price competition and margin reductions that they were no longer able to withstand given their cost structures. The "breakthrough" came earlier in Britain than Ireland. Wholesale innovators quickly moved to introduce new service technologies such as group trading and cash and carry. In Ireland the leading trade association continued to resist the emerging changes.
Businesses in both countries learned from developments overseas. Britain learned from the USA, whilst Ireland learned, in turn, from the British experience. Nonetheless, both industries also saw their relative position decline as non-traditional relationships and practices began to emerge among channel members elsewhere along the market chain (direct sales by manufacturers, associative buying groups and larger self-service supermarkets operated by ever stronger retail multiples).
Structural Reconfiguration
The transition from the old to the new order took time. While wholesaling was in flux, some of the more enterprising firms set about restoring their fortunes, through the importation of new ideas, formats and service technologies. One feature of this period was the declining role of trade associations in both countries. The enhanced focus on the trading/commercial aspects of relationships served to undermine any broader solidarity. This new commercial focus allowed some wholesalers and independent retailers together to achieve economies of scale and scope.
Although there were some important new entrants, many of the firms that succeeded during this period were based around long-established players from within the traditional wholesaling groupings. As this phase progressed, increasing reconfiguration and consolidation occurred through mergers, acquisitions, strategic partnerships and exits. The new order began to take more definite shape, with a smaller number of larger organisations in both countries. New formats of symbol group trading and cash and carry wholesaling became firmly established. However, the management and investment costs associated with group trading (as well as their inherent tensions) took their toll and the lower cost format of cash and carry increasingly found favour with both retailer and wholesaler. At the end of this period the industries in both countries had arrived at a very similar market position.
Structural Consolidation
The new order continued to consolidate as the new wholesaling formats became more dominant. Both countries experienced an initially strong bias towards cash and carry that subsequently reversed as convenience shopping began to grow in importance. However, this period is one where the two countries had differing experiences in a number of areas, including collective action, regulatory position and industry leadership.
In Britain, the retail multiples were given a clear path to dominance through decisions the British Government and regulatory authorities made in relation to both competition law and planning regulation. Furthermore, unlike the Irish situation, the British wholesale industry was unable to improve its margin position through collective action. During the 1970s and 1980s the role and power of the various independent sector trade associations largely dissipated as independent grocery retailing lost almost three-quarters of its national market share. Britain also experienced a considerable amount of "churn" among the leading wholesale companies, with Booker being the only leading survivor from the mid-1970s. This industry flux made it difficult for "statesmanship" activity
In contrast, the Irish wholesalers re-established an effective forum for collective action (IADT) during the late 1970s. This new association was led by a succession of industry "heavyweights". Having successfully used this forum to recover wholesalers' margins, it set its sight on demanding Government protection for the independent retailing trade and thus its supplying wholesalers. By co-opting the independent retailer association RGDATA, the combined IADT/RGDATA became one of the most effective lobbying groups in the country.
Through concerted political action the twin goals of both planning and competitive restrictions on multiple traders were achieved. Musgraves and BWG then consolidated their position through superiority in strategy, management and capital.
By avoiding a rapid decline in market share in the 1980s and by subsequently winning a regulatory umbrella, the independent sector in Ireland remained vibrant enough to capitalise rapidly on the emergence of the trend towards convenience. With strong consistent leading companies (albeit basically only two of them) applying coherent strategies, the wholesale sector revived and strengthened. In contrast, the British industry was severely weakened over the period with strong multiple retailer competition and inconsistent consolidation activities.
The cases can also be considered in the light of the issues raised by the literature on industry There is some evidence to support the notion of a reverse technological lifecycle effect. This study demonstrates the way that technologies that emerged from the manufacturing sector initially acted to promote greater process efficiencies within both wholesaling and retailing. In terms of drivers of evolution a number of specific themes and some wider generalisations from the cases are suggested. First, the role of Government actions in relation to both competition and to local planning has played a key part in the industry outcomes.
Government can significantly alter the direction of industry evolution through their action or inaction.
Secondly a key factor would seem to be the presence or absence of collective action.
Throughout the period wholesalers have relied extensively on co-operation as well as competition for their development. Some of this activity has been for competitive reasons, in areas such as the operation of symbol groups and to increase purchasing scale. However, on other occasions trade associations have been used to bring stability and to create political and social leverage. Both of these issues have been central to the story of the escalating rate of inter-channel competition.
Thirdly, scale has been important in the development and execution of strategy. Activity aimed a building a small number of well positioned, independent retailer operated, national convenience brands has been critical, though building this scale on a consistent basis both vertically and horizontally has not been straightforward. Despite this however the relative size of wholesalers when compared with major retailers or indeed manufacturers remains small. Scale has in turn had to be allied to operational efficiency and appropriate use of resources. For major retailers this has meant by-passing wholesalers and carrying out or organising the wholesale activities themselves.
Fourthly, market based strategies on their own are not enough to successfully compete. It is also necessary to develop and engage with non-market strategies. The development of political power and influence has been important in the maintenance of the wholesaling sector in Ireland. In Britain such power has been mainly absent and it is only recently that activities of this form have become more coherent.
Finally, there is the issue of time. The creation of a set of structures and of businesses within these structures takes time. However, most structures also have within them the seeds of their own destruction. Considerable effort has thus to be spent on maintaining existing situations.
If this is not done, then there would seem to be a tendency for structures to be undermined.
Time of course takes its toll on businesses and individual managers. Currently in Ireland, one could argue that dazzled by market success, turnover size and other scale elements, wholesalers and independent retailers have forgotten the value of non-market strategies and have allowed other influences to drive the political process, thus potentially undermining their success.
Conclusions
Overall this examination of grocery wholesaling in Ireland and Britain since the 1930s
suggests that there is a discernable pattern of industry evolution. However, it is a pattern of regeneration rather than of lifecycle. Furthermore, this evolutionary process is driven by important factors other than technological breakthrough. All of this suggests that the industry life cycle model needs to be reconsidered to accommodate significant finer-grained patterns within the so called 'maturity' phase.
There are some wider observations to be made in conclusion. First, we believe that the wholesaling industries examined here demonstrate again (see Fein 1998 ) that the patterns and processes of industry evolution in this service market are different to those in manufacturing or technology based industries. For example, the use of collective action for commercial purposes differentiates the evolution of wholesaling from that of many manufacturing industries. The way in which industry consolidation and concentration are managed and achieved, again appears very different.
Secondly, if wholesaling (or service sectors) is different then we need to develop the correct lenses through which to understand their evolution. Quinn and Murray (2005) have pointed to the potential of evolutionary approaches for conceptualisation of industry change, but have also noted that other more established approaches within organisation theory at the ecological level may also have value. Multi-faceted conceptualisations of wholesale industry change are needed.
Finally, there are of course disparities between Ireland and Britain. There is clearly a scale issue in economy terms as well as some differences in political, social, technological and economic systems and behaviours. Some of the issues we have highlighted reflect perhaps the abilities to achieve results in smaller markets. Others would appear to be common trends. It would be a major step forward if similar studies, taking similar approaches, but focused on grocery wholesaling in other countries e.g. USA, Japan, in Central and Eastern Europe, South Africa could be undertaken. By examining the dynamics of processes and patterns in industry evolution across countries strides may be taken in conceptualising and understanding the issues and the subject. We believe this is much needed.
Notes
1 -There is a paper to be written utilising the extensive research published to date on retail change in Britain during the period under consideration here, and the British case material developed during this research programme. However, this is not that paper. In order to compare the British and Irish cases, which is the main focus of this paper, in the space permitted, we have had to shelve that discussion in favour of a non-referenced tabular case study approach.
2 -The authors would like to thank the Institute of Grocery Distribution for allowing access for Jim Quinn to their resource centre containing this extensive run of The Grocer. It is possible that this source is not going to be available in a similar way in the future. To quote Joni Mitchell "You don't know what you've got till it's gone". 
